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CORIOLAN V. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE: A CLOSER LOOK AT
IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE POLITICAL REFUGEE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years concern about international human rights has
notably increased. There is a closer scrutiny of the repressive policies of many countries. As President Carter continues his worldwide fight for human rights, 1 Americans are becoming gradually
aware of the pitiful conditions prevalent in a number of foreign
countries. 2 Few nations can boast their governments are free of
human rights violations. 3 Upon a closer examination it is apparent
that a large number of countries are in the practice of restricting the
social, economic, and political rights of their citizens. 4
As a result of such oppressive conditions, many people seek
refuge in the United States. One method for seeking refuge is by
claiming that one has been persecuted because of one's race, religion, or political opinion. Relief of this nature is provided for by the
Immigration and Nationality Act 5 and in the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). 6 Unfortunately, the administration of such applicable laws is far from adequate.
Various factors, both political and legal, weigh heavily against
the alien. These factors include the reluctance of the United States
to open its gates to floods of repressed people throughout the world,
the constraint of the United States' foreign policy and its requisite
support of leaders of repressive governments, 7 the severe restrictions
on review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
1. N .Y. Times, June 22, 1978, §A, at 17. In welcoming foreign ministers of Latin America
to the 8th General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Washington on June
21, 1978, President Carter stated: "My Government will not be deterred from our open and
enthusiastic policy of promoting human rights, in whatever way we can." Id.
2. See New Hopes for Human Rights, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 556 (1977) (address by
Charles W. Maynes, Ass't Sec. for International Organizations Affairs, made before the
National United Nations Day Committee of the U.N. Association of the U.S.A., in New York
on Sept. 9, 1977); The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations, 77 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 165 (1977) (address by Secretary of State Vance); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § A, at
1, col. 3; id. § A, at 14.
3. U.S. Responsibility Toward Peace and Human Rights, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 759
(1977) (address by President Carter made before a meeting of the General Council of the
World Jewish Congress in Washington, D.C. on Nov. 2, 1977).
4. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 3.
5. 8 u.s.c. § 1253(h) (1976).
6. Done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.l.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (effective
Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Protocol].
7. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
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administrative decisions, K and the inability of the alien to procure
evidence that is likely to carry great weight in the decision-making
process. 11
In Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 10 the
Fifth Circuit took significant steps to alleviate and clarify the obstacles presented to the alien seeking refuge in this country. Coriolan
liberalized current interpretations of immigration law by relaxing,
somewhat, the evidentiary burden facing the alien seeking political
refuge in the United States. The concepts articulated in Coriolan
provide a more humanitarian approach for refugees and are the key
to a more realistic interpretation of the law.
II.

CORIOLAN V. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE

The petitioners, Raymond Coriolan and Willy Bonannee,
sought review of the deportation orders entered by the INS which
denied their request for political asylum. 11 Both of the petitioners
had entered the United States illegally by boat during 1974 12 and
they were therefore clearly deportable. rn The petitioners were Haitian nationals who claimed they would be persecuted if they were
forced to return to Haiti. 14
If the petitioners' claims were judged meritorious, the statutory
provisions would block their deportation. On July 13, 1975, the INS
convened the petitioners' deportation hearing. 15 At the hearing, the
petitioners stipulated to their deportability and then applied to the
district director for political asylum. 16 The district director denied
the petitioners' requests. 17 The aliens then sought relief under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 1K The statute
states:
8. See notes 82-102 infra and accompanying text.
9. See text accompanying notes 44-71, infra.
10. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977) .
11 . Id. at 995.
12. While the petitioners did not arrive on the same day, both entered the United States
at or near Miami, during 1974. Id., n .l.
13. 8 U.S .C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976) provides that any alien who enters the United States
"without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General
is deportable."
14. 559 F.2d at 995.
15. The procedure for a deportation hearing can be found in 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1978) .
16. 559 F.2d at 995.
17. Id.
18. 8 u.s.c. § 1253(h) (1976).
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The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems it
to be necessary for such reason. 111

The petitioners in Coriolan were given the opportunity to present evidence to prove that they would be persecuted if returned to
Haiti. The only type of evidence available to the petitioners, however, was their own statements. The first petitioner's (Coriolan)
accounts were sharply self-contradictory. In his sworn request for
asylum, he stated that the secret police came to his home to arrest
him. 20 Then, in a later interview with an INS investigator, Coriolan
changed his story and reported that he was never suspected of being
a Communist and and that the police never came to his home to
arrest him. 21 During that same interview, Coriolan stated that he
came to the United States to work, but that he also had "small
problems" with the police in Haiti. 22 Evidently he was involved with
a man who had problems with the police and who was about to be
arrested. 2:1 Coriolan claimed that he would be jailed or killed upon
his return to Haiti, as it was the policy of the Haitian government
to persecute returning nationals who fled the country illegally. 24
In his request for asylum, the second petitioner (Bonannee)
claimed that he feared persecution by the Haitian secret police (Ton
Ton Macoutes) because of his father's involvement in anti-Duvalier
activities. 25 Bonannee testified that he had been arrested and
charged with speaking against the government. 26 Bonannee, like
Coriolan, also feared prosecution for his illegal departure and stated
19. Id.
20. 559 F.2d at 995. Coriolan also swore that the police suspected him of being a Communist because he had been seen speaking to another Communist, Louis Pierre, who allegedly
was later jailed and disappeared. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. At this point, he related the fate of his mother's cousin who was murdered because
he refused to give the Ton Ton Macoutes a piece of cloth. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Coriolan expressed this fear both in his original written request for asylum and
at his final deportation hearing. Id.
25. Id. at 995-96. Bonannee stated that his father had been suspected of involvement in
an anti-Duvalier movement in 1971, and consequently fled to Cuba. The petitioner went on
to state that in 1973 his father's brother had been apprehended and never heard from again.
Id.
26. Id. at 996. In his testimony, Bonannee stated, "The Ton Tons said I was the same
breed as my father . . . . The change [sic] was speaking against the government. I don't
know reason for release." Id.
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that he expected to be shot or jailed if forced to return to Haiti. 27
Bonannee's assertions remained essentially the same throughout his oral interview, though he supplemented his written request
in some areas. 28 During its investigation, the INS received a letter
from the Department of State which addressed Bonannee's claims. 211
The letter stated that while the claim had some substance, the
political incidents in which his father had been involved had actually taken place in the 1950's. Taking this into consideration, the
State Department concluded that is was unlikely that the incident
concerning his father had lead to Bonannee's arrest.:1° Ultimately,
Bonannee confirmed that the incident took place in 1956, and that
it was in that year his father fled to Cuba.:1 1 Finally, Bonannee
described the events which led to his arrest, namely, he had a fight
with a militiaman who then recognized him as a member of a family
known to be anti-Duvalier.:1 2 After consideration of the evidence, the
immigration judge denied both the petitioners' requests under section 243(h) and ordered deportation.:i:i
The immigration judge based his decision on the petitioners'
failure to prove any actual instances of persecution and consequently concluded that the aliens had failed to show a well-founded
fear that their lives or freedom would be threatened in Haiti.:14 The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), subsequently affirmed the
lower administrative decision. 35 The BIA's decision simply reiterated the immigration judge's conclusion that the aliens had failed
to show a "well-founded fear of persecution. ":lfi The petitioners then
27. Id.
28. Id. Bonannee attributed his arrest in 1973 to becoming an adult (although he said
he was born in 1941). The petitioner also claimed that after release from prison he remained
in hiding almost six months, until coming to the United States. Id.
29. Id. 8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1978) requires the district director of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to obtain the opinion of the State Department when he denies
a request for asylum as "clearly lacking in substance." Evidently the district director wrote
a letter requesting this information on December 22, 1975 and obtained a response on April
12, 1976. 559 F.2d at 996 n.5.
30. Id. at 996.
31. Id.
32. Id. Bonannee also said his "wife" was put in jail after he left the country. Wife in
Haitian parlance appears to mean the woman with whom he was living. Id.
33. Id. at 995 n.2. The Attorney General has vested this power in the immigration judges,
whose decisions are then reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 C.F.R.
§§ 2.1, 242.21 (1978); see 8 C.F.R. § 100.2(d) (1978).
34. 559 F.2d at 998.
35. Id. at 997 .
36. The BIA's brief decision did not indicate the grounds or the reasoning that the Board
used in reaching its decision. Thus, the court of appeals had to resort to the immigration
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appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking review of the
administrative decision and a request for a reopening of the administrative proceedings for receipt of new evidence, in the form of an
Amnesty International report. 37 The report was compiled by a private group and went to the issue of whether Haitian political conditions are so specially oppressive that a wider range of claims or
persecution must be given credence. 3M
The Fifth Circuit agreed to review the administrative decision.
The court held that the immigration judge may have erred on two
important legal points. First, in his evaluation of whether the petitioners would be persecuted upon return to Haiti, 311 the immigration
judge assumed that prosecution for illegal departure was not persecution for one's political views. Second, the immigration judge
made certain assumptions based on the premise that people without
overt political activity cannot be subject to political persecution in
Haiti. 40 It was the majority opinion for the Fifth Circuit that in view
of the petitioners' new evidence, the Amnesty International report, 41
the petitioners' claims should have been considered with credence,
especially with regard to the oppressive conditions present in Haiti
and alleged in the report. 42 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the aforementioned
report. 4:1
The claims raised in this case are similar to claims advanced
by other petitioners in past years. Section 243(h) has, however, been
consistently interpreted as giving limited, if any, relief. As mentioned earlier, factors weigh heavily against the alien. Foremost
among these factors, and an important topic considered in Coriolan,
is the weight to be given the evidence that the alien produces to
support his case. A related and initial problem that the alien faces
is the stiff standard of evidence or the burden of proof.
III.

THE STANDARD OF EVIDENCE

Persecution, under the section 243(h) standard, is defined in
judge's reasoned opinion. Id. at 997-98. The Board utilized the standard articulated in the
1967 Protocol, supra note 6. See text accompanying note 135, infra.
37. 559 F.2d at 1003.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1000-01.
40. Id. at 1000-02.
41. Id. at 1002-04.
42. Id. at 1004.
43. Id.
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Kovac v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 44 as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or
political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive." 45 Recently, the
United States Government attorneys in Moghanian v. United
States Department of Justice, 48 urged the court to forsake the more
lenient standard of Kovac and adopt the stricter standard articulated by the BIA in In re Dunar. 47 The standard the agency advocated required that the petitioner show that "his life or freedom
would be threatened . . . on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 411
The Ninth Circuit in Moghanian, refused to apply the stricter standard, mentioning that Kovac was a well-reasoned decision and the
court could see no basis for re-examination at that time. 411
It is clear from interpretation of section 243(h), that the alien
has the burden of proving to the special inquiry officer'>0 that he
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion, as claimed. 51 In considering this issue, the standard of
proof5 2 consistently adhered to is that the alien must present a
"clear probability of persecution" 53 to obtain the discretionary withholding of deportation. Typically, the most serious problem facing
the alien is producing persuasive evidence of political persecution.
This burden of proof is difficult for the alien to meet, 54 because
access to evidence of the requisite weight is simply not available.
The types of reports that are relied on by the INS and the courts
are those of an official nature, and understandably, not usually
available to the alien. 55 The Government has an advantage because
it is able to produce evidence of this nature, in the form of affidavits
and summaries compiled by the State Department. Through this
44. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
45. Id. at 107.
46. 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973).
48. 577 F.2d at 142.
49. Id.
50. A special inquiry officer is a technical term for an immigration judge. See note 33
supra.
51. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1978).
52. For an alternate standard, see text accompanying notes 133-139 infra.
53. Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967).
54. The court in Kovac reasoned that the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act lightened the burden of the alien, but never indicated the extent of the
reduction. 407 F.2d at 106. See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra.
55. In re Tayeb, 121. & N. Dec. 739 (1968) (no documentary proof available); In re Cha,
B.l.A. No. 14100755 (1971) (unpublished) (documentary proof rarely available).
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method, the BIA and the immigration judge are able to request
information relating to the alien's case. 511
As a result of the evidentiary problem, the Government's evidence, which is based on official reports, 57 is difficult to refute. As a
rule, the INS does not question these reports. 511 This practice is one
of the major problems in an equitable determination of the issue.
The INS' failure to question these reports is the reason why the
Government's position contesting the alien's persecution is so unsatisfactory.
It is wholly inappropriate that the reports offered by the State
Department should be accorded the weight they have received. In
many instances, the United States has a significant interest in the
foreign government that the alien is fleeing from. 511 The State Department desires to preserve the status quo, in order to avoid evoking the displeasure of a foreign government. A conflict arises in the
case of an alien seeking political refuge in the United States. In
preparing their reports, the State Department may at times be
faced with the dilemma of disclosing human rights violations at the
risk of loss of political support from the alleged violators. The State
Department's possible conflict of interest is too great to accord its
reports the weight they have been given in the past.
It is apparent that the State Department reports have a heavy
impact at the administrative level, because the reports are documented and appear to be well supported. Furthermore, the effect of
the report is felt at the appellate court level because of the limited
scope of judicial review. Depending on a particular circuit's theory
on review of agency fact finding, the circuit court may not closely
review the evidence and thus the report will have the same conclusive effect that it had at the administrative level. 110 While the INS
56. Section 243.3(b), Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operating Instructions
(April 7, 1971). The Service has been requesting such information from the Department of
State since 1963. 1 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.lOd,
at 5-130 (rev. ed. 1978).
57. The INS requests for information are channelled to the American Embassy in the
state of proposed destination, whereupon, the Embassy makes inquiries into the status or
condition of that country, and about the ethnic, social, or political class or group in which
the alien claims membership. Inquiry is also made as to the alien himself to determine if there
is a possibility of persecution within the terms of section 243(h). E.g., Asghari v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, 396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968).
58. United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953); Sovich v.
Esperdy, 206 F.Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963).
59. The United States recognized the Duvalier government and has provided funds to
train the military police. THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 1975, at 50.
60. See Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
In Kasravi, the Ninth Circuit noted that the State Department's letter lacked persuasiveness.
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does have to request a report from the State Department concerning
the alien's allegations, the results of the report are not conclusive.
The INS has no obligation to rely on State Department reports
concerning the alien's allegations of persecution or to accept the
Department's opinion on whether :refuge should be granted. 61 The
Department's opinions are merely advisory, 112 but the trend is to give
their reports great weight. 83 At times the alien is not even allowed
to see the recommendation to refute its contents, and such information need not be made a part of the record if, in the opinion of the
special inquiry officer or the BIA, the disclosure of such information
would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. 64
As a result of the evidentiary problem, often the alien has only
his own statements to rely on. 85 Other forms of evidence which have
been offered by claimants include the testimony of relatives, 66 experts, 87 and newspaper articles, 811 all having limited success. In the
The court went on to question the Department's possible lack of competence to address
matters such as the ones at hand. Nevertheless, the court sustained the BIA's decision, which
was based upon the State Department letter. The Ninth Circuit justified its action on the
ground that the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Attorney General. For a
discussion on the limited reviewability of administrative decisions, see notes 79-101 infra and
accompanying text. See also Note, Persecution Claims - The Expanding Scope of Section
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 13 TEx. INT'L L.J. 327, 332-33 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Persecution Claims].
61. In re Lee, 13 I & N. Dec. 236 (1969).
62. See Zamora v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
The court of appeals was critical of the State Department letters received in evidence in
persecution claims under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Second
Circuit felt that the Department went too far when it made recommendations concerning
particular aliens. The court was disturbed by the weight the INS gave the evidence adduced
by the Department, and suggested that the Department refrain from applying knowledge of
the country to a particular case. The court went on to suggest that the State Department
limit themselves to giving useful information, "legislative facts," about the conditions in the
foreign country. Id. at 1063. In a footnote, the court added that it would be helpful if the INS
would furnish the State Department with the names of aliens whose section 243(h) claims
had been denied, so that the Department could do follow-ups on what had happened to the
aliens. This would help make the Department analysis of the current situation more realistic.
Id. at 1062 n.5.
63. See id. at 1063.
64. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1978). For a more detailed explanation of this case, see Evans,
The Political Refugee in the United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204
(1969).
65. In re Sihasale, 11 I. & N. Dec. 759, 762 (1966).
66. Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967)
(relatives and friends); United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 276 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (two brothers).
67. In re Liao, 11 I. & N. Dec. 113 (1965) (former Governor of Formosa); In re Torres
Tejeda, 10 I. & N. Dec. 435 (1964) (former agent of a quasi-military security unit in Trujillo
regime).
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case of Coriolan, additional evidence was available in the form of
the Amnesty International report. 811 Coriolan sought to have the proceeding reopened upon the receipt of this new evidence. 70
When seeking to reopen the hearing to present new evidence,
the alien faces the same onerous burden of persuasion. Courts require the alien to show "some likelihood that reopening the proceedings will result in a stay of deportation." 71 Thus, the alien must
demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution." 72 One court determined that aliens must, at the least, advance "some evidence indicating they would be subject to persecution . . . ."n
In Coriolan, the court maintained that the Amnesty International report74 on conditions in Haiti was clearly material. 75 The
68. See 11 I. & N. Dec. at 759; 11 I. & N. Dec. at 113; cf. Henry v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977) (unauthenticated reports).
69. Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. Id.
71. Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lam Leung Kam v. Esperdy, 274 F.Supp. 485, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
72. Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); 386
F.2d at 753.
73. 386 F.2d at 753.
74. For excerpts of the text of the report, see 559 F.2d at 1002.
75. Id. at 1003. ·The INS, in Coriolan, asserted that reopening the case to accept new
evidence was beyond the power of the court because the provision of the statute enabling
review did not cover this case. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1005a(a)(4) (1970)). The INS urged that
this statute directed the court to review INS action solely on the administrative record. The
statute, in pertinent part, states:
(4) except as provided in clause (8) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the petition
shall be determined solely upon the administrative record upon which the deportation order is based and the Attorney General's findings of fact, if supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,
shall be conclusive . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1976). The INS contended that section 1105a(a)(4) barred the reviewing court from using its power to remand upon the receipt of evidence which up to that point,
had not been admitted into the record. 559 F.2d at 1003. The power to remand is granted by
28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (1976), which reads as folllows:
(c) If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the
proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the
satisfaction of the court that(1) the additional evidence is material; and
(2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence
before the agency;
the court may order the additional evidence and any counterevidence the opposite
party desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings
of fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken . . . .
The majority did not agree with this analysis. In the opinion, it was pointed out that the INS
did not cite any cases to support its statutory construction. The court relied on Paul v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 521F.2d194 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the Fifth Circuit
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holding in this case demonstrates that increased weight must be
given to different types of evidence in order to augment the record
for a clearer understanding of the claimant's position. 76 Judicial and
administrative notice of the foreign country's conditions are important factors, especially in view of the unavailability of other types
of evidence. 77 More liberal treatment of the evidence available to the
alien is necessary.
The view usually espoused by the court in similar cases was
aptly argued in the dissent, 78 where the majority was severely admonished for giving weight to "an authorized report. " 79 The dissent
reviewed a number of cases80 dealing with the deportation of Haitian
nationals and concluded that Coriolan and Bonannee "never came
within shouting distance" of meeting the burden of persuasion. 111
In support for his contention that the petitioners had not met
their burden, the dissent cited Henry v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 82 for the proposition that the court's ability to review
the petitioner's failure to meet the burden of proof extends only to
whether the applicant had been accorded procedural due process
and to whether the decision was reached according to the applicable
rules of law. 83 The dissent criticized the court for its departure from
cases such as Henry which had refused to grant relief to allegations
being supported only by "conclusory statements from personal
entertained a request for a reopening pursuant to section 2347(c). In Paul, the request was
denied because the evidence sought to be admitted was not material. The Coriolan court
stated that the court in Paul made no suggestion that section 2347(c) was inapplicable to INS
cases. 559 F.2d at 1003. Rather, the court decided that the section "authorizes this court to
order a remand if the additional evidence is material and there were reasonable grounds for
failure to adduce the evidence before the agency." Id.
76. More recent clarification of this right to reopen is found in Martinez de Mendoza v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 567 F.2d 1222, 1226 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1977). Here, the court
cautioned that under normal circumstances a party asserting new and material evidence
should first resort to the administrative remedies under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1978), rather than
invoking the court's power under section 2347(c). Id.
77. See, e.g., In re Joseph, 131. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968). There, the Board took administrative notice of the fact that conditions in Haiti had not improved to any extent since 1964
(the death of "Papa Doc" Duvalier).
78. 559 F.2d at 1004 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1005. Judge Coleman characterized the evidence as "an unauthenticated report
distributed by a private group which purports to deal generally with conditions in Haiti, not
the circumstances of the petitioners themselves." Id.
80. Id. at 1004-05 (citing Martineau v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 556 F.2d
306 (5th Cir. 1977); Henry v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.
1977)).
81. 559 F.2d at 1005.
82. 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977).
83. 559 F.2d at 1005 (citing 552 F.2d at 131).
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knowledge and unauthenticated reports."K 4 The dissenting judge
characterized the Amnesty International report as an
"unauthenticated report distributed by a private group which purports to deal generally with conditions in Haiti, not the circumstances of the petitioners themselves. "K5
If State Department reports are to be the only type of document
acceptable in a refugee's search for relief, then it appears that section 243(h) will be of little help to the alien. The decision in Coriolan
is important for a number of reasons, foremost among these is the
court's willingness to recognize the importance of new forms of evidence. More liberal concepts of evidence are essential, especially
when one considers the severely limited reviewability of INS decisions.
IV.

REVIEWABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

A. Errors of Fact
Although the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation, K& such decisions by the INS are
traditionally discretionaryK7 and subject to limited review.HK As a
general rule, courts are reluctant to review the discretionary decisions of the Attorney General involving findings of fact which have
been imprecise in explaining the contents or process of what analysis has occurred.K" The courts have the power to review for abuse of
discretion as well as arbitrary and capricious action on the part of
the Attorney General. 90 Many courts state they cannot substitute
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 222 (1963). See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a) (1976). The text of the statute reads as follows: "The procedure prescribed by .. .
shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all
final orders of deportation .. . ."
87. 375 U.S . at 222. In this case, the Supreme Court held that a challenge to the exercise
of discretion by the Attorney General was reviewable only in the court of appeals. Although
Foti did not involve a request for relief under section 243(h), the Court indicated the rule
applied to other provisions of the immigration laws in which the Attorney General was
authorized to use his discretion. Id. at 229.
88. The courts are reluctant to interfere with the Attorney General's discretion unless
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or violative of the law. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952); see also Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F.Supp. 535, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (quoting
Fougherouse v. Brownell, 163 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Ore. 1958)).
89. See generally In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973) (discussing Muskardin v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1969); Kasravi v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968)).
90. See Shkukani v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Kerkai v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 418
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their opinion for that of the Attorney General. Instead, these courts
satisfy themselves by examining whether the denial of relief is supported by a "reasonable foundation," 91 "ample evidence," 112 or some
other evidentiary standard. In other cases, the courts have been
known to examine the case only to the extent of determining
whether the Attorney General's reasons are "sufficient on their
face." 93
When a court does review for abuse of discretion or arbitrary
and capricious action on the part of the Attorney General, it is
reluctant to fully explain its reasoning. Congress eliminated the
need for a factual finding by the Attorney General in section 243(h)
decisions, which makes abuse of discretion for findings of fact especially difficult to establish. 94 With some exceptions, courts have
rarely found abuse of discretion by the Attorney General in denial
of section 243(h) relief. 95 Furthermore, in the cases where the courts
have found abuse of discretion, the courts have not clearly articulated their reasoning. It is apparent, however, from the small number of successful claims, that very few aliens can satisfy the requirements necessary to obtain relief.
While the court in Coriolan did not base its decision on an
abuse of discretion in the findings of fact, the court .Pointed out the
deficiencies in the agency's treatment of the evidence. 96 The Fifth
F.2d 217, 219 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 1067 (1970); Hosseinmardi v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, 405 F.2d 25, 27 (9th Cir. 1968); Siu Fung v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d
555, 559 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 801 (1969); Morin v. Bouchard, 311 F.2d 181,
182 (3d Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.
1955). For a general discussion of the scope ofreview on appeal, see Persecution Claims, supra
note 60, at 332-34.
91. See Khalil v. District Director of the Immigration & Naturalization Service, 457 F.2d
1276, 1277 (9th Cir. 1972); Chi Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1961).
92. Antolos v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 402 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1968).
93. Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536, 537 (7th Cir. 1967).
94. Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (5th Cir.
1977).
95. Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)
(the circuit court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was
based on "patent misconstruction of the record" and did not weigh the evidence); United
States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955) (the court took judicial
notice of the "ruthless behavior" and "hazardous conditions" in Communist China and ruled
that an administrative decision of fact contrary to a fact judicially known is arbitrary and
capricious); United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F.Supp. 611, 615-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(the court held that the special inquiry officer, in refusing to reopen proceedings to permit
respondent to submit her section 243(h) application, acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. The court went on to conclude that the special inquiry officer's decision was an abuse
of discretion because he had failed to take administrative notice of the repressive conditions
in Haiti.).
96. 559 F.2d at 999.
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Circuit commented that while the judge's decision may be able to
withstand review, his decision should be articulated since, "it is also
a familiar principle of administrative law that a reviewing court will
not supply a reasoned basis for agency action that the agency itself
did not articulate." 97
The majority opinion indicated that it was difficult to discern
the basis on which the immigration judge had made his opinion. 911
The court recognized that the immigration judge probably discounted Coriolan's testimony because of his contradictory testimony and expressed dissatisfaction with the immigration judge's
even more ambiguous decision as to Bonannee's claim. 99 Here, the
immigration judge could have based his decision on a number of
reasons, yet none were set forth. 100 Although the majority indicated
that they considered this lack of clarity to be significant, they did
not base their holding on this issue. Rather, they went on to discuss
the possible errors of law present in the case.
B.

Errors of Law and Statutory Construction

Appellate courts have been willing to review cases involving
section 243(h) decisions for errors of law and statutory construction.
Generally, this review has centered around interpretation of the
phrase "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion. "101 Courts have reversed decisions of the BIA or immigration
judges upon finding that the section was misconstrued. 102 In Sovich
v. Esperdy 103 the Second Circuit held that it had authority to review
in order to determine whether the Attorney General used the proper
97. Id. The Supreme Court has made clear it "will uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v.
Ark.-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974).
98. 559 F.2d at 999. The immigration judge concluded that there was no evidence that
Coriolan had ever been arrested or in trouble with the Haitian police. This decision conflicts
with Coriolan's statement that the police had come to his house to arrest him because of his
implications with a Communist. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. These reasons included: lack of credibility produced by Bonannee's testimony,
disbelief that Bonannee would be punished for his father's deeds of 1956, or that the real cause
of the arrest was the fight with the militiaman-and this did not constitute a section 243(h)
persecution. Id.
101. See Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969)
(denial of employment and prosecution for illegal departure as persecution); Diminich v.
Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 884 (1962) (economic sanctions
as "physical persecution").
102. Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963); Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d
Cir. 1961).
103. 319 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1963).
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statutory standards in his exercise of discretion. 184 Ultimately, the
court found he had not and remanded the case so that a new application for relief could be considered using the correct standards. 105
Further clarification of the right to review for errors of law can
be found in Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service. 11HI In
this case, the alien, a Yugoslavian national of Hungarian descent,
left his ship which was docked in a United States port, and concealed himself until the ship departed from the port. The alien then
presented himself to the INS and sought asylum claiming he would
be subjected to physical abuse and confinement if he was forced to
return to Yugoslavia. 107 In Kovac, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the BIA's decision to deport the alien, in light of the 1965
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. 18K The 1965
amendments eliminated the premise on which the BIA based its
decision, namely, that to come within section 243(h), a denial of
employment opportunities must extend to "all" means of gaining a
livelihood. 169
The court in Coriolan based its decision on the possible errors
of law present in the case. 110 The majority was disturbed by the
immigration judge's treatment of the aliens in two important areas
of the law. 111 The court criticized the immigration judge for his poor
treatment of the petitioners' persecution claims, 112 as well as his
premise that the petitioners, because of their lack of political activity, are unlikely to be the victims of political persecution.11:1
104. Id. at 25-27.
105. Id. at 29. The court pointed out that the special inquiry officer had erred and
misconstrued the statute by assuming that conviction for illegal departure, a crime cognizable
in another legal system, was never physical persecution, by assuming that punishment for
illegal departure would not be politically motivated and would therefore not fit the statute's
requirement of persecution "because of . . . political opinion," and in failing to include
confinement as a possible form of persecution. Id. at 28-29.
106. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969). Kovac alleged he would be imprisoned upon return to
Yugoslavia because his desertion would be interpreted as a denunciation of Communism. ld.
at 104.
107. ld.
108. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § ll(f), 79 Stat. 918 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976)). The amendments were viewed by the court as shifting the emphasis
from the consequences of the oppression to the motives behind it, as well as lightening the
burden of proof faced by the alien by removing the requirement that the claimant must show
threat of bodily harm. 407 F.2d at 106-07. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
109. 407 F.2d at 106-07.
110. 559 F.2d at 1000-02.
111. Id. at 1000.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1001.
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Upon hearing the aliens' contention that they would be persecuted for illegal departure if forced to return to Haiti, the immigration judge wrote, "[i]llegal departure might possibly result in prosecution. Prosecution cannot be considered, under such circumstances, persecution because of one's political opinions."u 4 This statement disturbed the court because of the long line of cases which held
that prosecution for illegal departure can amount to persecution,
and in these circumstances relief should be granted. 115 With this in
mind, the court stated "we doubt that the immigration judge in fact
meant to exclude all claims of political persecution based on the
threat of punishment for illegal departure. If not, however, then we
must speculate as to the actual basis for his rejection of this
claim."ll& This need to speculate led the court to consider the judge's
decision concerning the aliens' illegal departure to be a possible
error of law. The appellate court did not dwell on this issue because
it considered the immigration judge's view of Haitian political conditions more disturbing.11 7
The court noted that the immigration judge based his observations on a faulty premise. The immigration judge assumed that
because neither Bonannee nor Coriolan belonged to any political
organization in Haiti and that since their political opinions did not
differ substantially from the vast majority of Haitians, they would
not suffer political persecution. The immigration judge was inaccurately relying on the supposition, "that people without overt political
activity, or minority political opinions, are unlikely to be the victims of political persecution."us The court pointed out that citizens
of Haiti can become the victims of government persecution without
committing conventional "political" acts, 119 noting that a variety of
114. Id. at 1000.
115. Id. (citing Berdo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir.
1970); Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969); Janus
& Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968)).
116. 559 F .2d at 1000. The court went on to examine the possible reasons the immigration
judge might have had for rejecting the claim, including rejection of the petitioner's credibility, refusal to believe the contention that the government prosecution was political in nature
(prosecution for fairly administered passport laws is not persecution), and disbelief that the
petitioners left Haiti for political reasons. Id.
117. Id. The court said: "In short, we would have great difficulty in effectively reviewing
the immigration's [sic] judge's dismissal of petitioner's fear of persecution for their illegal
departure. But the failure to adequately evaluate the significance of the illegal departure is
overshadowed by a more fundamental omission."
118. Id. at 1001.
119. Id.
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cases have been decided both for 120 and against 121 the alien where
there has been no overt political action.
In some of the instances where the alien has prevailed, the
courts have taken judicial notice of the political atmosphere within
the country . 122 In Coriolan, the court took the opportunity to explain, "we do not believe that the immigration authorities could
properly decide an alien's fate without taking note of conditions in
the alien's country, to the extent that an awareness of these conditions had become a part of the INS expertise. " 123 This statement is
significant because the court took judicial notice of the oppressive
conditions present in Haiti, on the basis of the evidence presented
and thereby placed in question the immigration judge's perception
that people without overt political opinions are unlikely to be the
victims of political persecution in Haiti. If read consistently with
the case law in this area, 124 one might argue that the immigration
judge abused his discretion when he viewed the evidence before him
as raising no more than the usual allegations of persecution. The
Fifth Circuit did not pursue this issue, however, and instead looked
to the admissibility of new evidence as a basis on which to remand
for a reopening of the proceedings. 125 The court also chose not to rely
120. United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F.Supp. 611(S.D.N.Y.1964) (the court
held that the alien's evidence of extensive government danger gave her claim "at least prime
facie credibility" and maintained the INS refusal to reopen was arbitrary and capricious. The
court also went on to take judicial notice of the conditions in Haiti.); In re Joseph, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 70, 72 (1968) (the Board also invoked notice similar to that taken by the court in Mercer
when it stated, "It is a matter of common knowledge and this Board takes administrative
notice that conditions in Haiti have not improved to any extent since 1964.").
121. See Paul v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975)
(aliens alleged government beatings, murders, andjailings); Gena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970) (alien alleged that his fear of police was the result
of one of the Ton Tons taking an interest in his wife); Hyppolite v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 382 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1967) (alien's father was murdered, friends reported the
police were questioning her whereabouts); In re Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. No. 2433 (Sept. 16,
1975), aff'd sub nom. Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated, 434 U.S . 962
(1977) .
122. 559 F.2d at 1001.
123. Id. at 1002.
124. See United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955)
("On the basis of a fact which we know judicially, an administrative determination of the
contrary fact is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore administrative action grounded on
that finding is outside the administrative discretion conferred by the statute."). Rut see Paul
v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 521 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1975) (where failure hy
the immigration judge to take notice of the conditions in Haiti was alleged to he prejudicial
to the alien's rights, but nevertheless was held to be not an abuse of discretion).
125. 559 F.2d at 1002.
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heavily on the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 126 a treaty established to protect the rights of refugees.
V.

THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES

Section 243(h) has been the subject of much criticism in recent
years, because of the narrow scope and the limited interpretation
given it by the courts.' 27 It has been characterized as being incompatible with the broad humanitarian policies of the United States
and as affording little protection to the alien. 128 Perhaps, because of
the poor rate of success in cases under section 243(h), 129 litigants
attempt to seek relief under the 1967 Protocol.
The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol in 1968, thereby
making key provisions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees (1951 Convention)1 30 applicable to the United States.
The introduction of the 1967 Protocol into the refugee scene places
in question the issue of whether the language of the 1967 Protocol
profoundly alters section 243(h), the current refugee legislation. It
has been argued that the language of the 1967 Protocol is couched
in noticeably different terms from section 243(h) and therefore the
two provisions are in conflict. 131 Two major areas of concern involve
126. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
127. See Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice,
3 INT'L LAW. 204, 230-33 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Evans, The Political Refugee]; see
!fenerally Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: Further
Developments, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1972), [hereinafter cited as Evans, Further
Developments).
128. Evans, The Political Refugee, supra note 127, at 253.
129. Id. at 242.
130. Done July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.l.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered
into force (U.S.) Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Convention]. While the United
States was not an original party to the 1951 Convention, when the country ratified the 1967
Protocol, it also made applicable articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention. See 1967
Protocol, supra, note 6, art. 1(1).
131. See Comment, Immigration Law and the Refugee-A Recommendation to Harmonize the Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CALIF. W. INT'LL.J. 129, 151 (1975). It is further asserted
hy the author that section 243(h) is ripe for supercession. Id. In determining whether the 1967
Protocol is a self-executing treaty and therefore supercedes the Act, consideration is given to
the treaty's history as well as the problems it was created to solve. Comment, Self-Executing
Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the United States Charter: A Separation of
Powers Problem, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 773, 776 (1976) (citing Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15
N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (1964); Schreuer, The Interpretation of Treaties by Domestic Courts, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255, 271-81 (1971)) [hereinafter
cited as Self-Executing Treaties].
Many other criteria are examined to determine the impact of a treaty. These include the
terms of the treaty, whereby the treaty is examined for express stipulation that the treaty
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the question of whether the alien's burden of proof has been lessened
and whether the discretion of the Attorney General has been altered
by the language of the 1967 Protocol. 132
The 1951 Convention defined "refugee" for the first time.
Under the Convention, a refugee is said to be one who, because of a
well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is
unwilling or unable to return to his country due to that fear. 1:i:i
The evidence a refugee must present, to lend support to his
claim, is a difficult burden to bear. 134 To alleviate this burden, the
petitioner in In re Dunar argued that the standard of showing a
"well-founded fear of being prosecuted," as set forth in article 33 of
the 1951 Convention 135 relieved the alien of the burden of showing a
"clear probability of persecution." 138 This argument would have
changed the standard held applicable in earlier section 243(h)
cases, m by maintaining that it was one's state of mind that was at
issue, not the likelihood of persecution. 138 The BIA rejected this
reasoning and held that since the fear had to be "well-founded," it
was or was not intended to be self-executing. Self-Executing Treaties, supra, at 776 (citing
.Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1899)). The actual language of the treaty is also examined.
See id. If the treaty's language is in the present tense, it is argued this provides evidence of
an intent to make a self-executing treaty. Id. (citing Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342
(1924)). Whereas language in the future usually indicates a non-self-executing treaty . Id.
(citing Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1929)). The circumstances
surrounding the treaty's execution is checked. Id. This would include diplomatic correspondence and interpretative documents. Id. (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)). See also
5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180-83 (1943). Finally, the subject matter of
the treaty is also examined. See Self-Executing Treaties, supra, at 778. The subject matter
approach finds its roots in the separation of powers concept. Certain types of treaties within
presidential control of foreign affairs are inherently more likely to be self-executing (i.e.
extradition, consular rights, friendship, smuggling and rights or treatment of aliens), whereas
treaties within the control of Congress (i.e. appropriations, custom duties and disposition of
government property) are more likely to be non-self-executing. Id.
132. Comment, supra note 131.
133. 1951 Convention, supra note 130, art. 1(2).
134. See text accompanying notes 44-68 supra.
135. 1951 Convention, supra note 130, art. 33.
136. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 319 (1973).
137. E.g., Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 440 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971);
Hamad v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 420 F.2d 645 (D.C Cir. 1969); Cheng Kai
Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967).
138. In other words, "it is not necessary that the individual seeking asylum he able to
prove that he would actually face persecution upon his return, but rather that he established
that his fear of being persecuted, based on his previous activities or other factors, is a reasonable one." ROBERTS, ASYLUM AND CURRENT REFUGEE DETERMINATIONS, 53 INT. REL. No. 20 (May
25, 1976).
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could not be merely subjective. 139 A recent Seventh Circuit decision
supported this conclusion and denied relief. 14° Finally, the Supreme
Court was given the opportunity to review the issue in Pierre v.
United States. 141 Here the Court, in a summary disposition, granted
certiorari, but then vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for consideration of the question of mootness. 142 Unfortunately, this
summary action gives no indication to lower courts as to what
weight the 1967 Protocol should have.
In reaching decisions like Pierre, the courts have derived their
support almost exclusively from the legislative history surrounding
the accession to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. An
examination of the legislative materials reveals that the Senate did
not contemplate radical change in the existing immigration laws
since they thought the laws were generous and a model rfor the
world. 143 In this case, however, the immigration laws can hardly be
described as generous for refugees.1 44 Rather, the courts should look
to the ideals of humanitarianism espoused by many presidents and
diplomats. 145 The United States can hardly be viewed as an example
of humanitarianism when the Government itself does not follow its
treaties, and the statute it purports to follow is a virtual nullity.
139. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 319. The Board looked to an early report of the Ad Hoc Committee
which framed the provision: "The expression well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, means that a person has
either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he fears persecution." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 10 U.N.
ESCOR, Annex II, 1 at 39, U.N. Doc. No. E/16i8 (1950), quoted in 14 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
140. Kashani v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 547 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1977).
141. 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
142. Id.
143. See generally President Johnson's message to the Senate, S. Exec. K., 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., at III, in which the President states: "It is decidedly in the interest of the United
States to promote this United Nations effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status
for those fleeing persecutions."
144. For a good discussion of one such instance, see Johnson, Haitian Refugees to Press
U.S. for Political Asylum, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 1.
145. Presidents, since Truman, have voiced concern for the plight of refugees. In a letter
of submittal to President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk informed him that, "United
States accession to the 1967 Protocol would not infringe adversely upon the laws of the
country." S. Exec. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at VII. The Secretary of State went on to state:
Accession to the Protocol would promote our foreign policy interests through
reaffirming, in readily understandable terms, our traditional humanitarian concerns
and leadership in this field. It would also convey to the world our sympathy and firm
support in behalf of those fleeing persecution. Actually, most refugees in the United
States already enjoy legal and political rights which are equivalent to those which
states acceding to the Convention or the Protocol are committed to extend to refugees
within their territories.
Id. at VIII.
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In examining the question of whether article 33 of the 1951
Convention changes the scope of the Attorney General's discretion,
one cannot help but notice that the language of the two provisions
is cast in vastly different terms. Article 33 speaks in mandatory
terms, "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of. territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened . . . . " 146 Section 2
of article 33 carves out the only exception to the rule, denying relief
when an alien constitutes a security threat to the host country or
has been convicted of a serious crime. 147 Section 243(h), on the other
hand, merely "authorizes" the Attorney General to withhold deportation where it is his "opinion" that the alien would face persecution.1414 Using these criteria, courts repeatedly construed section
243(h) as giving the Attorney General "broad discretion" to withhold deportation. 149 The mandatory standard of the 1967 Protocol
would be a more realistic way of determining relief, rather than
depending on the discretion of the Attorney General.
After extensively reviewing much of the 1967 Protocol's legislative history, the BIA in Dunar considered the question of whether
article 33 of the 1951 Convention compelled a change in the Attorney General's broad discretionary powers. The BIA implied that the
Attorney General's discretion afforded the alien enough protection. 150 It found no substantial difference in coverage of article 33
and section 243(h), 151 and instead down played the issue by declaring that the BIA was not aware of any cases in which the Attorney
General's discretionary relief was denied where the alien showed a
"clear probability of persecution. " 152
In summary, the BIA concluded that article 33 effected no substantial change in the application of section 243(h) "either by way
146. 1951 Convention, supra note 130, art. 33, § 1 (emphasis added).
147. Id. art. 33, § 2. Section 2 reads as follows:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country
in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
148. Immigration & Nationality Act§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).
149. See Muskardin v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 415 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
1969); Kasravi v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206
F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
150. See In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 322 (1975).
151. Id. at 320 n.20.
152. Id. at 322. For a complete discussion of this issue, see Comment, supra note 131.
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of burden of proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions." 15:1
This position was supported by a subsequent BIA decision 154 as well
as the court of appeals. 155
The majority in Coriolan, while not addressing the issue fully,
did state that the broad grant of discretion given to the Attorney
General must be measured in light of the 1967 Protocol. 156 The court
noted that here still existed the question of whether the Attorney
General's broad discretion had been altered by the 1967 Protocol. 157
The court, however, briefly passed over this issue in order to reach
the broader conclusion that adherence to the 1967 Protocol
reflects or even augments the seriousness of this country's commitment to humanitarian concerns, even in this stern field of law. It
may be appropriate to add that the foreign policy of the United
States has recently become more dra}llatically focused in the protection of human rights around the world. 1511

This humanitarian approach of the 1967 Protocol, to the refugee situation, is totally different from the spirit in which section
243(h) was enacted. It is argued that the enactment of the 1967
Protocol was meant to be a step toward a more sympathetic attitude
to refugees, and thus modifies section 243(h). Better understanding
of this argument is obtained by looking at the section's legislative
history.
VI.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 243(h)

Section 243(h) was first enacted, in a form somewhat similar to
the present one, in section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 1511
which read, "[n]o alien shall be deported under any provision of
this Act to any country in which the Attorney General shall find
that such alien would be subject to physical persecution." 1611 Under
153. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 322.
154. In re Cenatice, I. & N. Dec. No. 2571 (Mar. 28, 1977).
155. Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1977) vacated, 434 U.S. 962 (1977)
(the Court left intact the Service's procedure for determining refugee status); Kashani v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Cisternas-Estay v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 531 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 8f>3
(1976) .
156. 559 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 997. The court felt that the 1967 Protocol did not " profoundly [alter! American refugee law." Id. In Pierre, the court did not decide the issue of the 1967 Protocol's effect
on United States laws. 546 F.2d at 1289.
158. 559 F.2d at 997.
159. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987 (commonly known as the
Suhversive Activities Control Act of 1950, codified at 50 U.S .C. §§ 781-798 (1976)) .
160. f>f>9 F.2d at 1010.
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this provision the burden of proving "physical persecution" rested
on the alien, but the decision of whether to deport was not discretionary. The Attorney General was required to suspend deportation
when he found the alien would be subject to physical persecution if
he returned. 181
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 182 while retaining
the possibility of a plea of physical persecution, amended section 23
to emphasize the discretionary nature of the Attorney General. 183
The amended action read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion
the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reasons. m

Dissatisfaction with the stringent terms of the 1952 version of the
Immigration and Nationality Act was expressed by Presidents Truman, 185 Eisenhower, 1811 Kennedy, 187 and Johnson. 188 On July 23, 1963,
161. The Act was passed over presidential veto. See 96 CONG. REc. 15629 (1950). This
Act was not implemented to direct relief to refugees, rather it was focused at controlling the
spread of communism in the United States. See id. The Act reflected some awareness of
Congress to the situation faced by refugees. S. REP. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
Although the House of Representatives' draft of the Internal Security Act of 1950 did not
recognize the political dangers to which a refugee might be subjected, the Senate amended
the draft to include a provision for refugees. Id.
162. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
163. See United States ex rel. Camezon v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization Service, 105 F.Supp. 32, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). "It is apparent that the amendment of
Title 8 U.S.C.A. § 156 by§ 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 was made with the internal
security of the nation in mind and not with any solicitude for the objectionable alien's
welfare." ld.
164. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (emphasis added) (passed over the veto
of President Truman). The Act constituted a codification and revision of the immigration
laws then in effect. It was not designed to encourage an influx of aliens, including political
refugees. See S. REP. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
165. The President's Commission on Immigration & Naturalization, appointed by President Truman in 1952 and headed by former Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman, severely
criticized the 1952 Act in its report. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME (1953). The Commission said with regard to political asylum:
One of our national traditions is that we have provided asylum and haven to the
oppressed of other lands. This we were able to do until 1924 because our law was
flexible enough to meet such situations. Asylum for the oppressed is thwarted by the
national origins system. . . .
The United States is one of the few major democratic countries of the free world
whose present laws impede and frequently prevent providing asylum.
ld.
166. President Eisenhower recommended changes in the Act on a number of occasions.
K~ .. H.R. Doc. No. 1, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961).
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President Kennedy submitted a comprehensive program for revision1119 to Congress, which was endorsed by President Johnson and
enacted into law in 1965. 170
The 1965 amendments affected the political refugee by substituting the phrase "persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion" for "physical persecution" in section 243(h) .171 The
legislature recognized that "[t]echniques of persecution are not
limited to bodily violence alone." 172 The implications of the 1965
amendments are unclear. The amendments may be read as liberalizing the heavy burden of proof. There is, however, no indication in
the legislative history or congressional intent to support this conclusion. Indeed, given the continuation of the Attorney General's grant
of discretion, it may be argued that Congress merely expanded the
types of persecution covered by the section and did not alter the
burden of proof the alien must meet. As evidenced by cases following the 1965 amendments, little practical change has occurred in the
operation of the statute. 173 As mentioned previously, however, the
United States is becoming more aware of persecution throughout
the world, 174 with this perception, comes a need to adapt our statutory provisions to make them consistent with current attitudes. The
1967 Protocol provides a new route to effectively and moderately
adapt the current statutes.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Coriolan is an example of a court taking a more contemporary
approach to the refugee problem. In Coriolan, for the first time the
court did not delve deeply into the legislative history of the 1967
Protocol for an excuse to escape applying the treaty's plain lan167. President Kennedy expressed dissatisfaction with the Act in his hook . J. KENNEDY,
A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 77 (rev. ed. 1964).
168. President Johnson urged changes in the Act. E.g., Remarks to Representatives of
Organizations Interested in Immigration and the Problems of Refugees, 1 Pue. PAPERS 123
(,Jan . 13, 1964).
169. See Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House on
Revision of the Immigration Laws, 1 Pue. PAPERS 594 (July 23, 1963) .
170. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11011557 (1976)).
171. Id. at 918.
172. H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1965).
173. Rut see, Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F .2d 102, 106 (9th Cir.
1969). The court in Kovac reasoned that the 1965 amendments lightened the burden of the
alien. The burden, according to Kovac, is met by showing that "he would probably suffer
persecution." Id. at 107.
174. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
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guage. Instead, the Coriolan court looked to the humanitarian ideals
that the 1967 Protocol sought to implement, rather than looking to
the restrictive mood in which section 243(h) was originally enacted.175 There is support for this approach throughout the history
of immigration policy. Following the enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 176 American immigration policy gradually
evolved to become a more humanitarian concept. The United States
moved away from the restrictive construction of the Internal Security Act of 1950, by enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act, 177
which repealed many of the Internal Security Act's provisions. 1711
Further liberalization and expansion of the scope of the statute can
be seen in the addition of the 1965 amendments. 1711 It is reasonable
to assume that the next step in the evolution of the doctrine would
be implementation of a policy consistent with the 1967 Protocol.
The United States prides itself as being in the forefront on issues
concerning human rights. 180 The 1967 Protocol provides the means
by which the United States can follow through her commitments.
It would be inappropriate for the United States to expect other
signatories of the 1967 Protocol 181 to follow the treaty's provisions
175. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
176. Ch. 1024 § 23, 64 Stat. 987.
177. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
178. Id . at 279-280.
179. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11011G57 (1976)).
180. See S. Exec. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at III. In his message to the Senate, regarding
the 1967 Protocol and State Department report the President stated:
It is decidedly in the interest of the United States to promote this United Nations
effort to broaden the extension of asylum and status for those fleeing persecution.
Given the American heritage of concern for the homeless and persecuted, and our
traditional role of leadership in promoting assistance for refugees, accession by the
United States to the Protocol would lend conspicuous support to the effort of the
United Nations toward attaining the Protocol's objectives everywhere. This impetus
would be enhanced by the fact that most refugees in this country already enjoy the
protection and rights which the Protocol seeks to secure for refugees in all countries.
Thus, United States accession should help advance acceptance of the Protocol and
observance of its humane standards by States in which, presently, guarantees and
practices relating to protection and other rights for refugees are less liberal than in
our own country.
Id. See also TIME, Feb. 27, 1978, at 22.
181. These include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana,
Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep., Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Fed. Rep. of Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania,
Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, and Zambia.
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when the United States, who played such a large role in its ratification, refuses to do so. The approach followed by the court in
Coriolan better reflects the current American policy of protection of
human rights throughout the world.
It is important to remember that seeking refuge under section
243(h) is a last resort, often a life or death measure for the refugee.
After an alien is denied relief under section 243(h), he has no alternative but to leave the United States. For this reason, sympathetic
attention must be given to the alien's plea for relief. The United
States has, for many years, recognized the existence of the refugee
problem. Adequate legislation exists. The existing legislation need
only be applied in a humanitarian manner, consistent with contemporary American views on human rights.
It is argued that section 243(h) is ripe for supercession and that
article 33 lessens the burden of proof that the alien is forced to
bear. •K 2 A more modern approach to the burden of proof issue would
support the goals the treaty sought to achieve, and make the alien's
burden more realistic. One reason the aliens burden is so oppressive,
is that he simply does not have access to authoritative evidence. The
Fifth Circuit in Coriolan accepted the Amnesty International report
as relevant material. 183 In giving more weight to a new and different
type of evidence, such as the reports of private groups and private
citizens living in foreign countries, the claimants are given a fairer
chance for relief.
Other proposed forms of relief include clarification of section
243(h) by Congress and a more sympathetic and realistic approach
by the Attorney General when exercising his discretion. The statement that article 33 does not change the immigration laws can be
negated when one views the apparent problems in implementation
of section 243(h). One can hardly believe that Congress intended to
enact a statute which is a virtual nullity. The forerunner of section
243(h) was enacted in the spirit of the 1950's, 184 at a time in which
the country was more interested in restricting immigration than
aiding refugees. The attitudes of Americans have changed substantially since the 1950's, evolving toward a more humanitarian approach. Currently, while section 243(h) is used by the alien seeking
asylum, it rarely gives relief. 185 A positive approach to the situation
182. Comment, supra note 131, at 151-52.
183. 559 F.2d at 1002-03.
184. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987 (commonlv known as the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-798 Ci976)).
185. Since the 1965 amendments, the BIA has granted a stay of deportation under §
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and a liberal interpretation of Coriolan will have the effect of breathing new life into a statute which up to this point has lost most of
its effectiveness.
Patricia J. Sheridan
243(h) in only four reported cases: In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70; In re Janus & Janek, 12
I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968); In re Salama, 11 I. & N. Dec. 536 (1966); In re Alfonso-Bermudey,
12 I. & N. Dec. 225 (1965) .
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